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We study the short-run performance of Chinese privatization initial public offerings (PIPOs), 
using data on 668 new issues on the both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 1 





th trading days are 129.16%, 126.93%, 126.93% and 124.95%. We use 
cross-sectional analysis to explain the extraordinarily severe underpricing of Chinese IPOs, and 
find that IPO underpricing is primarily explained by the high demand caused by the quota system, 
and the high proportion of uninformed individual investors. Estimation results show that the 
Information Asymmetry Hypothesis explains the underpricing in Chinese IPO markets well, 
while the Signaling Hypothesis does not. In terms of government behaviour, the government does 
not send signals to the market on the quality of the issuers by underpricing, but it does capture the 
market opportunities to time IPOs to get the best market feedback on offerings. In addition, 
government ownership has a negative impact on the underpricing, which shows that privatization 
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1. Introduction 
 
The formation of the two stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990 was 
unprecedented in socialist China. Besides seeking efficiency and productivity 
transformation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through economic and shareholding 
reforms, the government allowed enterprises to raise funds by issuing corporate bonds 
and stocks to the public. Capital-raising was hailed as the most significant 
achievement of the shareholding reform.  
 
The privatization of state-owned enterprises in China provides an interesting case 
study of initial public offerings (IPOs) because of its importance in the transition from 
socialism to a modern market economy. In addition, in November 2001, China joined 
the WTO (World Trade Organization). Opening up its securities markets has been put 
into the government’s schedule, so understanding of the performance and the 
characteristics of Chinese IPO markets is important for both domestic and foreign 
investors who want to enter the Chinese markets.  
 
IPO underpricing—a large positive gain of a new issue immediately after flotation—
is a recurring phenomenon in many markets, and has been noted as one of the 10 
puzzles in financial research (Brealey and Myers, 1991). A common perception is that 
the underpricing of IPOs is a challenge to market efficiency, and that is may hurt 
emerging firms trying to raise capital for expansion (Loughran et al., 1994). A 
number of theories of IPO underpricing have been put forward and tested against the 
data of various stock markets. Ibbotson et al. (1988) found that the average first-day 
IPO return was 16.3 percent in the years 1960-1987 in the US market. Levis (1990) 
studied a sample of 123 offers for sale on the London Stock Exchange for the period 
1985 to 1988 and found that on average the market-adjusted discount was 8.6% on the 
first day of trading. The study of Loughran et al. (1994) also confirmed that this IPO 
underpricing phenomenon exists in 25 countries, with higher IPO underpricing in 
developing markets than in developed markets. The extent of IPO underpricing ranges 
from a few percent (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1989) for 38 US investment bank 
issues to an astounding 149.3% in the developing Malaysian market (see the summary 
table by Hanley and Ritter, 1992).  
 
Research also suggests that on average privatization initial public offerings (PIPOs) 
offer a higher initial premium than their private sector counterparts. Menyah and ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
Copyright 2002, Chi and Padgett  2
Paudyal (1996) found that UK PIPOs offered an average initial premium of 38.7% as 
compared to 3.48% for private sector issues. Paudyal et al. (1998) confirmed that 
Malaysian PIPOs offered significantly higher initial returns (103.5%) than other IPOs 
(52.5%) by comparing 18 PIPOs with 77 private sector IPOs using data from KLSE 
main board for the period January 1984 to September 1995.  
 
In a study of Chinese IPOs, Datar and Mao (1998) studied 226 sample firms that went 
public in 1990-96 and found the underpricing of Chinese IPOs was 388%. Mok and 
Hui (1998) used 87 A-share IPOs and 22 B-share IPOs on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange to test the underpricing of Chinese IPOs and found A-shares underpriced by 
289% while B-shares were underpriced by only 26%. Gu (2000) studied the 68 
companies that went public in 1994 and that were traded on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, and found the market-adjusted returns were 222%. Liu and Li (2000) 
studied 781 stocks listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 1991 
to 1999 and got the average market-adjusted return of 139.4%. From the existing 
surveys, we can see that Chinese A-share IPOs have almost the highest underpricing 
degree among all the stock markets. This striking statistic raises the following 
question: Why is the degree of underpricing in China so extraordinarily large?  
 
In this paper, first, we discuss the features of China’s emerging stock markets and 
certain unique ‘Chinese Characteristics’ that may affect the underpricing of IPOs. 
Second, we estimate the extent of the underpricing of 668 A-share IPOs that went 
public on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 1 January 1996 to 31 





th trading days for the whole sample are 129.16%, 126.93%, 126.93% 
and 124.95%, which are significantly positive at the 1% level. Thirdly, using a 
regression approach, we have identified that the quota system and the high proportion 
of uninformed individual investors are the key reasons for the extraordinarily severe 
underpricing in the Chinese IPO markets. We find the Information Asymmetry 
Hypothesis can explain IPO underpricing in China, while the Signalling Hypothesis 
does not fit well. In terms of government behaviour, the government does not send 
signals to the market on the quality of the issuers by underpricing, but it does capture 
the market opportunities to time IPOs to get best market feedback on offerings. In 
addition, government ownership has a negative impact on underpricing, which shows 
that privatization is welcomed by the investors. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the features of 
China’s stock markets and IPO underpricing; Section 3 presents the data and the 
methodology for calculating the short-run returns; Section 4 offers the results on the 
short-run returns and a comparison with other studies; Section 5 explains the severe 
underpricing by the huge demand for IPOs, the Information Asymmetry Hypothesis 
and the Signaling Hypothesis. The results for the cross sectional analysis are reported 
in Section 6. Summary and conclusions appear in Section 7.   
 
2. Features of China’s Stock Market and IPO Underpricing 
 
There are two major differences between western IPOs and Chinese IPOs. First, the 
economic system in most western countries is capitalism, while China is a socialist 
country and in China the vast majority of IPOs are partial privatizations. Privatization 
raises many additional concerns since the government often attempts to achieve 
multiple objectives via privatization, such as the extension of private share ownership, 
keeping government credibility and efficient control of the economy. Such objectives 
can result in the government actually aiming to underprice the shares in privatized 
companies, viewing the forgone revenue as the price of achieving such objectives.  
 
Second, in most western countries, the stock market is a real market--investment 
bankers and issuers price IPOs with the consideration of issuers’ financial status and 
market situation. While in China, since the history of the stock markets is only 11 
years, to control risks and avoid a crash in the new market, the government plays an 
important role in the development of the stock market. In the primary market, the 
government sets the quota for companies allowed to go public, prices IPOs for issuers 
with little feedback from the market, and times IPOs according to the market’s 
performance. 
 
The following characteristics of the offering and listing processes distinguish Chinese 
IPO markets from those in other countries. 
 
The China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) determines an annual quota
1 for 
new shares to be issued each year. The quota is allocated among the provinces and 
state-industrial commissions according to criteria that support regional or industrial 
                                                
1 This quota system started to change in 2001. Investment banks can recommend companies to the 
CSRC for listing, but it is still the CSRC which makes the final decision. ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
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development goals, in consideration of the balance among provinces and industries 
(Su and Fleisher, 1999). In theory, business strength is the criterion for enterprises to 
be chosen. Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs
2) also need permission from the CSRC. 
 
After a firm is permitted to go public, shares not retained by the government, other 
enterprises or employees are sold to outside investors through IPOs and SEOs. In 
China, stocks are classified by ownership into eight categories: Non-negotiable stocks: 
State-owned Stocks, Founder Stocks (Local), Founder Stocks (Foreign), Legal-Entity 
Stocks, Employee Stocks
3; Negotiable stocks: A Shares, B shares, and H shares 
(shares of Chinese companies traded in Hong Kong stock exchange) (Mok and Hui, 
1998). According to the CSRC statistics, at the end of 2000, negotiable (tradable) 
shares comprised around 35.7% of the total shares. 
 
In China, there are two stock exchanges—the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Shanghai is the financial centre in China. Shenzhen is a 
city in southern China and next to Hong Kong. Although it does not have the same 
financial traditions as Shanghai, it was the first city to carry out economic reforms 
from the beginning of the 1980s.  
 
The two types of stocks tradable on the two exchanges in China are ‘A’ shares and 
‘B’ shares. The ‘A’ shares, traded in domestic currency (Yuan), are exclusively for 
domestic Chinese. The B shares, traded in US dollars on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and in Hong Kong dollars on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, are 
exclusively for foreign investors and allocated primarily by private placements
4. The 
A- and B-share markets are segmented. Since the B-share market is very small and 
illiquid in comparison with the A-share market, most studies on the Chinese securities 
markets are based on the A-share market. 
 
The offering price is chosen by the CSRC days sometimes months before market 
trading starts, and in most cases there is little feedback through market demand that 
allows adjustment in the offer price (Su and Fleisher, 1999). In fact, underwriters and 
                                                
2 All the SEOs we mentioned in the paper refer to SEOs to the existing shareholders. 
3 Companies that went public before November 1998 can issue 10% of the shares in total public 
offering to their employees. The employee stocks could be traded 6 months after the shares were listed 
in the stock exchange. Since the underpricing of Chinese IPOs is very severe, the employee stocks 
were treated as a form of bonus to employees. 
4 From February 2001 domestic Chinese could invest in B shares in foreign currencies.  ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
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issuers do not have rights to price IPOs. The CSRC also takes charge of the timing of 
IPOs due to the market situation and capacity. 
 
The offering mechanism adopted by most Chinese firms is different from those in 
mature stock markets. As a result of the serious imbalance of supply and demand, the 
A-shares are distributed through a lottery system, in which there is a fixed price offer 
with investors bidding for quantities. The odds of winning the lottery depend on how 
much money joins the lottery. Winners are selected via a random number generating 
scheme and are entitled to purchase shares (usually one thousand shares) at the issue 
price (Gu, 2000). As the demand for the new shares far exceeds the supply, only a 
small percentage of the subscriptions win the lottery. 
 
It is also noteworthy that SEOs are very frequently observed among Chinese issuers 
and that SEOs account for a substantial portion of shares issued. About 91% of the 
Chinese firms that went public before 1 July 1994 issued seasoned equities before 1 
January 1996 (Su and Fleisher, 1999), because IPOs and SEOs are the most cost-
efficient way for Chinese enterprises to raise capital.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
The sample used in this study comprises 668 companies which issued and listed their 
A-shares in either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2000. The primary source of data is the GTA 
China’s IPOs Database
5. The prices of the new issues at their launch and their 
respective prices at the end of first day, the fifth day, the tenth day and the twentieth 
day of trading are recorded. The daily prices are obtained from the GTA China’s 
Trading Database.  
 
There are 750 companies that listed A-shares in the Chinese markets during the 
sample period, with an average of 150 IPOs per year and a standard deviation of 
51.851 (Table 1, Figure 1). It can be seen that IPO activity peaked in 1997 with a 
record of 206 IPOs being brought to the markets, and then went down to its lowest of 
98 IPOs in the year 1999. As for the monthly issue, it reaches its lowest in February 
since in China during the two-week Spring Festival Holidays in February the markets 
                                                
5 The database is offered by Shenzhen GTA (Guo Tai An) Information Technology Co., Ltd. ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
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are closed (Table 2, Figure 2). The number of monthly listings then starts to increase 
dramatically and reaches its peak in June.  
 
When we compare the annual and monthly issuing numbers (Figure 1, Figure 2) and 
the performance and returns of the market index (Figure 3-4, Figure 5-6), We can see 
a close relationship between the index performance and issuing numbers. In 1996 and 
1997, the market index grew rapidly from 554 to 1258 in Shanghai and from 112 to 
406 in Shenzhen, since the Chinese government decided to develop its securities 
markets and reinforce its capital raising functions at the end of 1995. During this 
period of time, IPO activity stayed very high with 203 issues in 1996 and 206 in 1997. 
In 1998, due to the Asian Financial Crisis, the CSRC enhanced risk control in the 
securities markets to avoid crash of the market. The market index remained quite 
stable in 1998, and although it increased a lot in the first half of 1999, it fell sharply 
from July 1999 to December 1999. Comparatively speaking, the number of IPOs fell 
in 1998 and reached its lowest—98, in 1999. After two years of market management 
and operation, the market started to grow again. When the market index started to 
increase rapidly in January 2000, the number of IPOs returned to 137 in 2000.  
 
Turning to the monthly issues, the index returns in quarter 2 and 4 of each year were 
positive, but those in quarter 1 and 3 might be positive but smaller, which means that 
the index grew faster in the second and fourth quarters of each year. In China listed 
companies are required to issue their annual reports from 1 January to 30 April. Listed 
companies always try to release some good news to stimulate transactions and create 
the tendency for share prices to increase. And there tends to be a time lag between the 
announcement of good news and the price increasing. Therefore, the market index 
grows more rapidly during the second quarter than any other time of the year. As for 
the positive returns in the fourth quarter, in our opinion, since institutional investors 
have to make their financial reports towards the end of the year, they intend to drag 
share prices up to create better performance. Figure 2 shows that the number of issues 
in quarter 2 and 4 is higher than that in quarter 1 and 3, and it keeps growing within 
quarter 2 and 4. In China, the CSRC arranges and times IPOs. It chooses to launch 
IPOs when the market is performing well, so as to improve prospects for capital-
raising and to invoke a positive response to privatizations. 
 
Table 1 shows that the total number of listings in Shanghai is the same as that in 
Shenzhen--375, but the annual figures show that its standard deviation is 24.4, in ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
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comparison with 33.3 in Shenzhen. The two stock exchanges are both non-profit 
membership organizations, rather than limited companies. When a company gets 
permission from the CSRC to issue stocks, it can choose to be listed in either stock 
exchange. Both stock exchanges are actually like two branches under the supervision 
of the CSRC.  
 
A total of 82 IPOs were excluded from the sample because of the following problems:  
missing issuing dates, missing the first day’s trading price and missing the market 
index value at the issuing date.  
 
To facilitate direct comparisons with existing empirical evidence, the measures of 
performance for each IPO and for groups of IPOs will be calculated using the 
methodology used by Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993). We describe the 
methodology below. 
 
The total return for stock ‘i’ at the end of the first trading day is calculated as: 
1 ) / ( 0 1 1 - = i i i P P R                                                                                                         (1) 
where  1 i P  is the price of the stock ‘i’ at the close of the first trading day, and  0 i P  is the 
offer price and  1 i R  is the total first-day return on the stock. 
 
The return on the market index during the same time period is: 
1 ) / ( 0 1 1 - = m m m P P R                                                                                                      (2) 
where  1 m P  is the market index value at the close of first trading day and  0 m P  is the 
market index value on the offer day of the appropriate stock, while  1 m R  is the first 
day’s comparable market return.  
 
Using these two returns, the market-adjusted abnormal return for each IPO on the first 
day of trading is computed as: 
( ) ( ) [ ] { } 1 1 / 1 100 1 1 1 - + + · = m i i R R MAAR                                                                     (3) 
 
The value of  it MAAR , i.e., the market-adjusted abnormal return for IPO ‘i’ on the 
th t day of trading can be computed in an analogous manner. 
 
When  1 i MAAR  is interpreted as an abnormal return, the assumption is that the 
systematic risk of the IPOs under consideration is the same as that of the index, i.e., 
the betas of the IPOs average to unity. A number of studies, both in the US (Ibbotson, ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
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1975 and Affleck et al., 1991) and in the UK (Sudarsanam, 1992), have demonstrated 
that the average beta of newly listed firms is higher than one. Thus, the abnormal 
return  1 i MAAR  calculated in (3) provides a somewhat upwardly-biased estimate of the 
initial performance of the IPO relative to the market. 
 
Like some other studies on Chinese securities markets, we use the Shanghai A-share 
Index and the Shenzhen A-share Index as corresponding benchmarks. They are 
capitalization-weighted indices, using all listed A-shares in the stock exchange. 
 

























1 1 ) / 1 ( 1 / ) / 1 ( 1                                                               (4) 
 
where  1 WR  is the wealth relative for the first day’s trading and N is the total number 
of IPOs in the sample.  
 
The sample mean abnormal return for the first trading day,  1 MAAR , may be viewed 
as a performance index which reflects the return, in excess of the market return, on a 






i MAAR N MAAR
1
1 1 / 1                                                                                            (5) 
 
To test the hypothesis that  1 MAAR  equals zero, we compute the associated t statistic: 
[ ] [ ] N S MAAR t / / 1 =                                                                                                   (6) 
where S  is the standard deviation of  1 i MAAR  across the companies.  
 
Note that WR t  and  t MAAR , respectively the wealth relative and sample mean 
abnormal return for the t
th day’s trading are computed in an analogous manner. These 
measures have been used by Ritter (1991), Levis (1993) and Ljungqvist (1997). 
 
4. Results on Short-run Underpricing 
 
We now proceed to apply the methodology outlined above to estimate the returns on 
the IPOs in our sample. We compute  t MAAR , WR tand the associated t-statistic. We 
choose to look for underpricing at the end of the first trading day (t=1). To try to 
capture the trend of the short-run returns, we also examine the situation at the end of 
fifth, tenth and twentieth trading days (t=5, 10, 20). ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
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The results of our analysis using the corresponding Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share 
Index as the market benchmarks are presented in Table 3. We report our results for 
the entire sample of 668 IPOs and also separately for IPOs on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. 
 
The average market-adjusted initial return of 668 IPOs on the first trading day is 
129.16% for the entire sample and is highly statistically significant at 1% level. The 
wealth relative for the first day’s trading is 2.28, which implies that the IPOs 
outperform the market from 1996 to 2000. The returns from the 1




th trading days decrease from 129.16% to 126.93%, 126.93% and 
124.95% respectively, with the wealth relative decreasing from 2.28 to 2.26, 2.25 and 
2.22. 
 
In comparison with the average initial returns in other studies of the Chinese IPO 
markets which are around 200-300%, the returns obtained here are much lower. In our 
opinion, there are two reasons for this difference. First, the time periods of other 
research are quite early, most being before 1994. As we mentioned early in the paper, 
before 1996 the Chinese IPOs markets were very immature and volatile, and the 
supply of IPOs was very limited. With the huge demand, the initial returns were 
tremendously high. Liu and Li (2000) documented that the first day’s initial and 
abnormal returns of IPOs in China were much higher in 1991, 1992 and 1993 than 
those in other years. In addition, with less experience when pricing IPOs, the CSRC 
tended to underprice to a greater degree to encourage the growth of the primary 
market. Secondly, due to the shortage of data, some researchers calculate the initial 
returns without consideration of the growth of the whole market, while in our study, 
the initial returns are market-adjusted. Since we can see from Figure 3 and 5 that the 
market index grew dramatically from 1996 to 2000, and the average time difference 
of issuing and listing in China is much longer than that in other countries, only 
market-adjusted returns can give us accurate pictures of the degree of underpricing in 
the Chinese IPO markets.    
 
When comparing the market-adjusted initial returns on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 





th trading days are all higher than those on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, with the higher standard deviation, which is the same as Liu and Li (2000). ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
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However, from Table 4, we know that the excess short-run returns on these two stock 
exchanges are not significantly different from each other. The Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange are both non-profitable membership 
organizations under the supervision of the CSRC. After getting permission to go 
public, issuers can choose to be listed on either stock exchange, and therefore it is 
understandable that there is not much difference between the initial returns of IPOs in 
these two stock exchanges. 
 
5. Explaining the Short-run Underpricing 
 
5.1. Quota System and Underpricing 
For the Chinese government, the stock market is an important channel to raise capital 
for SOEs. To keep it growing and to raise more money in the future, the government 
has to control the ‘supply’, that is the quota of new issues. In privatisation, the success 
of any IPO not only affects the individual company’s reputation, but also the 
government’s credibility. The government cannot afford any possible failure in the 
IPO markets. That is why the government has to make the supply much less than the 
demand, even at the cost of underpricing.  
 
Another reason for the high demand for IPOs is the lack of attractive investment 
opportunities. In China, besides stocks, bank deposits and Treasury Bonds are the 
only investment instruments available to Chinese investors. In order to stimulate 
consumption, the Chinese government reduced the interest rate several times during 
the sample period, which made investors see no point in putting money into banks. 
 
Chau et al. (1996) and Gu (2000) both mentioned that the lack of investment 
opportunities causes the huge demand for stocks and high initial returns of IPOs in the 
Chinese market. However, none of them tested this hypothesis using market data. Liu 
and Li (2000) tested the relationship between the winning rates and the underpricing 
of IPOs for part of their sample and found the significantly negative relations. In our 
research, we define the odds of winning the lottery to quantify the demand for IPOs, 
since it shows how much money has been invested to buy the newly issued shares and 
what the chance is to get the shares out of the total investment. The lower are the odds 
of winning a lottery, the more attractive IPOs are to investors, thus the higher the 
initial returns they should have.  
 ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
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Hypothesis 1: 
H 0: There is no relationship between the odds of winning the lottery and the market-
adjusted initial returns of IPOs.  
H1: There is a negative relationship between the odds of winning the lottery and the 
market-adjusted initial returns of IPOs. 
 
5.2. Information Asymmetry and Underpricing 
Rock’s Winner’s Curse Hypothesis (1986) is based on information asymmetry 
between the informed and uninformed investors. He justifies that this information 
asymmetry may make the uninformed investors end up primarily with the less 
successful IPOs. Keeping them in the market, therefore, requires an additional 
premium—the average underpricing of all IPOs. In China, until 2000, the 
government—the CSRC took the responsibility to price IPOs. To keep the country as 
a socialist country, the government must own a certain number of shares after IPOs. 
On the other side, in the Chinese securities markets, about 90% of investors are 
individual investors, who do not have access to sufficient information on SOEs. 
Therefore, there are two parties during the event, one is the government which 
actually owns companies either before or after IPOs and prices all the IPOs, and the 
other is the individual investors who lack either the investment experience or the 
knowledge of the quality of SOEs. To keep the uninformed individual investors in the 
market, the government has to underprice the IPOs and leave much money on the 
table for the further development of the IPOs markets. 
 
To test this hypothesis, we define the percentage of shares owned by the government 
and the government-owned companies as the proxy for the size of the information 
asymmetry. The more shares owned by the government, i.e. the fewer shares owned 
by the individual investors, the lower should be the underpricing of IPOs.  
 
Hypothesis 2: 
H 0 : There is no relationship between the percentage of shares owned by the 
government and government-owned companies and the market-adjusted initial 
returns of IPOs.  
H1: There is a negative relationship between the percentage of shares owned by the 
government and government-owned companies and the market-adjusted initial 
returns of IPOs. 
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Beatty and Ritter (1986) extended Rock’s model and showed that the expected 
underpricing is an increasing function of the uncertainty about the market clearing 
price of an IPO. The theory implies that the risk of smaller firms is higher than that of 
larger firms, and hence they should experience a higher initial market-adjusted return. 
In our study, we use the offering size, rather than the company size, as the proxy, 
since on one hand, all the companies belong to the government, given the 
government’s credibility, company’s size does not make much difference to the risk 
of the company. On the other hand, the Chinese securities markets are not efficient, 
and inside trading and price manipulation are rife. The size of the offering will 
directly affect the feasibility of price control of certain stocks. The smaller is the 
flotation size, the easier it is for institutional investors to control the share price, and 
thus riskier the stocks will be. Therefore, we expect that the lower market value of the 
flotation, the higher will be the risk and market-adjusted initial returns. 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
H 0: There is no relationship between the flotation size of IPOs on the first trading day 
and the market-adjusted initial returns of IPOs.  
H1: There is a negative relationship between the flotation size of IPOs on the first 
trading day and the market-adjusted initial returns of IPOs. 
 
Another proxy for the uncertainty of the listed companies we have chosen is whether 
the company has certain high-tech products as defined by the Science and Technology 
Ministry. High-tech products can offer companies a huge potential for development in 
the future. However, they also have much risk. In comparison with companies in 
conservative industries, companies with high-tech features are more difficult to price, 
and thus should enjoy higher initial returns on IPOs. 
 
Hypothesis 4: 
H 0: There is no relationship between the feature of belonging to a high-tech industry 
and the market-adjusted initial returns of IPOs.  
H1: There is a positive relationship between the feature of belonging to a high-tech 
industry and the market-adjusted initial returns of IPOs. 
 
5.3. Government Behaviour, Signalling and Underpricing 
Most researchers try to study the underpricing of IPOs in China by observing the 
market situation, just like the studies of western IPO markets. However, since the vast ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
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majority of IPOs in China are partial privatizations, the government is the real issuer 
of IPOs and the CSRC not only prices IPOs, but also times IPOs. Looking at the 
government behaviour in the Chinese IPO markets to see whether the government 
tries to send some signals to the markets is more meaningful in this case.  
 
The signalling hypothesis argues that underpricing is a deliberate attempt by the issuer 
to signal its quality to the market. In Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989), 
‘good’ firms try to distinguish themselves from ‘bad’ firms by incurring a cost that the 
less successful firms cannot profitably sustain. This cost is the underpricing of the 
initial issue. Allen and Faulhaber’s model implies that the better firms will underprice 
more, and will have higher earnings. Welch’s model explicitly accounts for the 
possibility of subsequent issuance of equity or debt in the secondary market. In his 
model, a high-quality firm will underprice to distinguish itself from the low-quality 
firm and will be rewarded at the time of the seasoned issue.  
 
Following these two models, we test the relationship between the profitability of 
listed companies, the number of SEOs within two years after IPOs and the market-
adjusted initial returns. Instead of looking at the sizes or prices of SEOs, we use the 
number of SEOs within two years after IPOs. According to the security regulation in 
China, the size of SEOs at each point in time cannot exceed 30% of outstanding 
shares. Since as long as the listed companies get the chance to carry out SEOs, they 
would like to raise as much capital as possible, the sizes of SEOs can be expected if 
the numbers of SEOs are known.  
 
If the government tries to give the market some signals of the quality of the 
companies when pricing IPOs, we expect the underpricing of IPOs to reflect the 
business strength and the development potential of the issuers. Therefore, firms with 
higher underpricing should have higher profitability and raise more funds through 
SEOs after IPOs. 
 
Hypothesis 5: 
H 0: There is no relationship between the earnings per share in the issuing year and 
the market-adjusted initial returns of IPOs.  
H1: There is a positive relationship between the earnings per share in the issuing 
year and the market-adjusted initial returns of IPOs. 
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Hypothesis 6: 
H 0: There is no relationship between the number of SEOs within two years after IPOs 
and the market-adjusted initial returns of IPOs.  
H1: There is a positive relationship between the number of SEOs within two years 
after IPOs and the market-adjusted initial returns of IPOs. 
 
Secondly, we would like to test how government ownership affects the underpricing 
of IPOs. Different people understand this element from different viewpoints. When 
Aussenegg (2000) studied IPOs in Poland, he raised the hypothesis that due to the 
pure signalling effect, high-quality firms will underprice their issues and only offer a 
small part of their share capital at the initial issue, which implies a negative 
relationship between the initial market-adjusted returns and the fraction of the share 
capital sold at the initial offer. In studies of Chinese IPO markets, Mok and Hui 
(1998) documented that high retention of equity by the state and state agencies has 
two opposing implications. On one side, a high percentage of equity retention by the 
government may signal inefficiency of the management and low marketability of the 
stock post-flotation. High equity retention, on the other hand, may reflect the owner’s 
faith in the business and thus lowers investor ex-ante uncertainty and IPO 
underpricing.  
 
Since the goal of privatization is to improve the efficiency of management of SOEs, 
in our opinion, shares owned by outside investors should improve the corporate 
governance of state-owned companies. Therefore, we expect that the fewer shares are 
owned by the government and government-owned companies, the more confident 
investors will be in the future development of the companies, and the higher initial 
returns will be. 
 
Hypothesis 7: 
H 0 : There is no relationship between the percentage of shares owned by the 
government and government-owned companies and the market-adjusted initial 
returns of IPOs.  
H1: There is a negative relationship between the percentage of shares owned by the 
government and government-owned companies and the market-adjusted initial 
returns of IPOs. 
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Thirdly, as the CSRC is also responsible for timing IPOs, we want to test whether 
there is any relationship between the index performance and the degree of 
underpricing by using year and quarter dummies. 
 
The estimation method is ordinary least squares. We use the market-adjusted initial 
returns as the dependent variable in the regression analysis.    
 
The empirical models are displayed as follows. Since among all the variables, the 
number of SEOs counts activity within two years after IPOs, the sample firms tested 
on this variable have to be cut at the end of year 1998. Model 1 tests the relationship 
between the market-adjusted initial returns and all variables except the number of 
SEOs on all IPOs that went public from 1996 to 2000. While model 2 tests the 
regression on all independent variables including the number of SEOs for IPOs that 
went public from 1996 to 1998.  
 
Model 1: 
MAAR 1 i = a  +  1 b Lotrate i  +  2 b Govshare i  +  3 b Log (Offersize) i  +  4 b Hightech  
                  Dummy i  +  5 b EPS i  +  6 b Year1996 i +  7 b Year1997 i  +  
                  8 b Year1999 i +  9 b Year2000 i +  10 b Quarter1 i  +  11 b Quarter2 i  +  
                  12 b Quarter4 i + u i      
 
Model 2: 
MAAR 1 i = a  +  1 b Lotrate i  +  2 b Govshare i  +  3 b Log (Offersize) i  +  4 b Hightech  
                  Dummy i  +  5 b EPS i  +  6 b SEOtimes i  +  7 b Year1996 i  +  8 b Year1997 i  
                  +  9 b Quarter1 i  +  10 b Quarter2 i +  11 b Quarter4 i  + u i      
 
Table 5 gives the description of the variables used in the study. Table 6 reports the 
characteristic values of the variables used in the study.  
 
6. Results of the Cross Sectional Analysis 
 
As a preliminary examination of the pair-wise relationships among the variables in the 
study, correlation coefficients are estimated. The results of these estimations are 
provided in Table 7. The results of the regressions on the market-adjusted initial 
returns which have been corrected for heteroskedasticity are presented in Tables 8 and 
9. Table 8 shows the estimation results for all variables except the number of SEOs on ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
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all IPOs that went public from 1996 to 2000. Table 9 offers the results of the 
regression on all independent variables including the number of SEOs for IPOs that 
went public from 1996 to 1998.  
 
Like Liu and Li (2000), we find an extremely significantly negative relationship 
between the odds of winning the lottery and the market-adjusted initial returns. When 
more people want to invest in a certain IPO, the huge demand causes severe 
underpricing. This also validates the notion that there are bandwagon effects in the 
Chinese IPO markets, as in Gu (2000). Chinese people are very group-oriented. When 
they find others are interested in a certain initial stock issue, they may decide to buy 
even when there is no favourable information about the issue. In addition, during the 
lottery process, when more people want to buy the newly issued shares, more funds 
will be deposited in the lottery accounts. With higher investment cost and opportunity 
cost, investors will definitely expect higher initial returns on the secondary market. 
The result on the lottery rate variable suggests that null hypothesis 1 can be rejected 
and the lottery rate has a negative impact on the underpricing of IPOs. 
 
As for the test of the Information Asymmetry Hypothesis, all three variables show 
significance with the expected signs of coefficients. As Koh and Walter (1989), Levis 
(1993) and Keloharju’s (1993) studies in Singaporean, British and Finnish stock 
markets, we find that the ‘winner’s curse’ is obvious in the Chinese market. For listed 
firms, the fewer the shares owned by the government and government-owned 
companies (as a percentage of ownership of the government and government-owned 
companies), i.e. the more shares owned by the individual investors, the higher are 
market-adjusted initial returns. This lends support to our earlier proposition that since 
the government knows more about the quality of all the companies and the level of 
risk involved in an initial issue, to make uninformed and inexperienced investors stay 
in the markets, the government has to underprice IPOs. This finding validates the 
rejection of the null of hypothesis 2 and shows that high proportion of individual 
investors is one of the important reasons for underpricing of IPOs in China. 
 
Regarding the offering size of IPOs, we take its logarithm as the independent variable, 
tested to be significantly negative related to the market-adjusted initial returns, which 
is confirmed by Ritter (1984), Beatty (1989), Levis (1993) and Liu and Li (2000). As 
we expected, the smaller the offering size a company has, the lower will be the 
marketability of the stock post-flotation, so the higher the risk investors will face. In ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
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addition, since price manipulation by institutional investors is quite common in China, 
the smaller the flotation size is, the easier it is for institutional investors to control one 
company’s stocks, thus higher uncertainty of the future price performance of the 
stocks. Therefore, as one of the proxies of the risk and uncertainty, the offering size 
has a negative effect on the initial returns. This result shows the rejection of null 
hypothesis 3. 
 
The third proxy employed to test the Information Asymmetry Hypothesis is the high-
tech feature of the issuers. The estimation result also shows significance with the 
same positive sign on the coefficient as we predicted. When an issuer produces some 
high-tech products, investors expect the company to have good potential for future 
development and price performance, while at the same time, the risk of the company 
increases as well. In this case, to compensate the extra risk investors take, when 
pricing IPOs, companies have to underprice the IPOs. Thus the null of hypothesis 4 
can be rejected. 
 
Until now the high demand hypothesis and the Information Asymmetry Hypothesis 
seem to be working very well to explain the high market-adjusted initial returns in the 
Chinese IPO markets. However, when we test the Signalling Hypothesis to see 
whether the government tries to give the markets some signals when pricing IPOs, the 
results are very different from our expectations and from the results of some other 
researches.  
 
We find that the earnings per share of the listed companies in the issuing year are not 
significantly related to the market-adjusted initial returns of IPOs. When running 
regression 2 including the number of SEOs within two years of IPOs, with results on 
all other variables remaining almost the same
6, the coefficient on the number of SEOs 
is not statistically significant. As Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989) 
suggested, if the government wants to give signals of the quality of the issuers, the 
underpricing should reflect the quality of the firms, and since the better companies 
should have higher earnings per share in the issuing year, and would need to raise 
more capital after IPOs, both variables should be positively related to the market-
adjusted initial returns. However, the results are both negative and insignificant. 
Therefore, we can conclude that when pricing IPOs, the government does not send out 
any signals to the markets. There may be two reasons for this result. First, it is 
                                                
6 Only the significance level on ‘Hightech’ variable changes from 1% to 7.7%.   ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
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possible that the government is not very good at pricing IPOs. Even if it tries to signal 
using prices, it fails. Secondly, the government is intentionally averaging the prices of 
IPOs, since all the issuers belong to the government, and it cannot give certain 
companies preference over others. Therefore, the null of hypotheses 5 and 6 cannot be 
rejected.  
 
The last hypothesis concerns the percentage of shares owned by the government 
again. Although we know the estimation result that the percentage of shares owned by 
the government and government-owned companies is significantly negatively related 
to the market-adjusted initial returns, hypothesis 7 has a different interpretation from 
hypothesis 2. Instead of looking at the information asymmetry between the 
government and the individual investors, we look at this variable from the viewpoint 
of signalling. Estimation results show that since the aim of privatization is to improve 
the efficiency of management of SOEs by reinforcing the corporate governance, the 
more shares the government gives up, the better the corporate governance the 
investors will expect on the listed companies, therefore the higher the market-adjusted 
initial returns IPOs will be, which shows that the privatization is welcomed by the 
investors. While Gu (2000) found the negative connection between the state 
ownership and the underpricing at the 10% significant level, our results show that 
they are negatively related to each other at the 1% significant level. Thus, the null of 
hypothesis 7 can be rejected. 
 
Among the coefficients of the four year dummies and three quarter dummies, those 
for year 1996, year 1997, year 2000, quarter 2 and quarter 4 are significant. When 
comparing with the index performance and the issuing number in these different years 
and quarters (Figure 1, 2, 3, 5), we find that the government captured most 
opportunities on timing IPOs. In 1997, the market index grew rapidly, and the CSRC 
delivered 206 IPOs which is the highest issuing number in the sample period. The 
coefficient of the year 1997 dummy is significantly positive, which shows that the 
CSRC caught the chance to time IPOs well and let people who invested IPOs that 
went public in 1997 gain higher abnormal returns. After the market adjustment for the 
Asian Financial Crisis, the market index started to rally in 2000. The issuing number 
went from 98 in 1999 to 137 in 2000. With the significantly positive coefficient on 
the year 2000 dummy, the IPOs in 2000 enjoyed higher abnormal returns than the 
average. Only the significantly negative coefficient on the year 1996 dummy and the 
high number of IPOs could not match with each other, which shows that the CSRC ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
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timed the 203 IPOs in 1996 with lower initial returns than the average. This might be 
because in the early years, the CSRC was still not very skilful in timing IPOs. Or 
when we look at the index performance in 1996, it was even better than that in 1997. 
The CSRC might be too anxious to catch up the rapid growth of the index, while 
delivering too many IPOs to the market, which could not absorb them. Therefore, the 
market-adjusted initial returns of IPOs in 1996 were lower than the average. 
 
As for the quarter dummies, the coefficients of both quarters 2 and 4 are positively 
significant. When looking at the quarterly issuing, we can find that the issuing 
numbers in quarters 2 and 4 were higher than those in quarters 1 and 3 and within 
quarters 2 and 4 the number kept on growing. The higher returns match with the 
higher issuing numbers in quarters 2 and 4. Therefore, the CSRC did a good job in 
timing IPOs in certain months to get the highest possible initial returns.  
 
Some people may ask why the government tries to increase the initial returns of IPOs. 
In our opinion, when the CSRC finds an increase in the market index, it starts to 
launch more IPOs to the market. Since the market performs very well during that 
period of time, the initial returns are therefore higher than those in other time periods. 
Although underpricing is a cost for issuers, as the owner of all the listed companies, 
the government has to try its best to keep the IPO markets attractive to investors and 




This study attempts to fulfil the great need for Chinese evidence on the short-run 
performance of IPOs. We confirm that Chinese IPOs enjoy much higher initial returns 
than those in other countries, and find that there is not much difference between the 
initial returns of the two stock exchanges in China. We also find evidence supporting 
the new relationship between the quota system for IPOs, the high proportion of 
uninformed individual investors and the huge market-adjusted initial returns in the 
Chinese IPO markets.  
 
Using the A-share IPOs from 1996 to 2000 on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges, we explore the relationship between demand, Information Asymmetry, 
government behaviour and the degree of underpricing of IPOs. We find evidence 
supporting the notion in Chau et al. (1996) and Gu (2000) that the high demand for ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
Copyright 2002, Chi and Padgett  20
IPOs has a significant positive effect on the initial returns. We test the Information 
Asymmetry Hypothesis in the Chinese IPO markets and find it can explain the 
underpricing as in previous research (Rock, 1986, Beatty and Ritter, 1986, Mok and 
Hui, 1998, Gu, 2000). The results show that the ownership of the informed 
investors—the government and government-owned companies, has a significantly 
negative relationship with the initial returns. Moreover, as the proxies for risk and 
uncertainty, the offering size of IPOs has a significantly negative effect while the 
high-tech feature of the company has a significantly positive effect on initial returns. 
As for the testing of the Signalling Hypothesis, interestingly, unlike previous research 
(Su and Fleisher, 1999), we do not find a statistically significant direct relationship 
between the quality of the companies represented by the earnings per share in the 
issuing year and the number of SEOs within two years after IPOs, and the 
underpricing of IPOs. However, as a signal of the role of corporate governance after 
IPOs, the ownership of the government shows a significantly negative effect on the 
initial returns, agreeing with Gu (2000). When looking at the timing of IPOs, we find 
that more than half of the year and quarter dummies coefficients are significantly 
positive, which shows that the government captured good market performance, and 
launched more IPOs during those periods of time to take advantage of that 
performance of the IPO market, although the cost of underpricing was high. 
. 
The results obtained from this study provide important information for prospective 
investors in new issues to better understand Chinese IPO markets and the 
government’s future policy on privatization. IPOs with lower lottery rates, less 
government ownership, smaller offering sizes and high-tech features and that go 
public when the market performance is good are wise investments. However, 
investors should be aware that the degree of underpricing cannot be a signal of the 
quality of the listed companies in China. To further develop the IPO markets and keep 
the capital raising functions, the government will still control the supply of IPOs. 
Therefore, the underpricing will not disappear. However, when individual investors in 
China become more knowledgeable and experienced, the degree of underpricing 
would be expected to go down. 
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Table 1: IPOs in the Chinese Markets by the Year of Issuing 
 





















1996  203  103  100  155  77  78  76.355  74.757  78.000 
1997  206  85  121  185  79  106  89.806  92.941  87.603 
1998  106  53  53  95  50  45  89.623  94.340  84.906 
1999  98  46  52  98  46  52  100.000  100.000  100.000 
2000  137  88  49  135  86  49  98.540  97.727  100.000 
Total  750  375  375  668  338  330  89.067  90.133  88.000 
Mean  150.000  75.000  75.000  133.600  67.600  66.000       
S.D.  51.851  24.382  33.279  38.273  18.257  25.836       
 
*SH stands for the Shanghai Stock Exchange; and SZ stands for the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. 
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Figure 1: A Diagrammatic Representation of the Distribution of IPOs on the 
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Table 2: IPOs in the Chinese Markets by the Month of Issuing 
 





















1  45  17  28  44  16  28  97.778  94.118  100.000 
2  25  10  15  17  7  10  68.000  70.000  66.667 
3  39  17  22  29  14  15  74.359  82.353  68.182 
4  59  27  32  55  24  31  93.220  88.889  96.875 
5  68  40  28  58  34  24  85.294  85.000  85.714 
6  121  57  64  110  52  58  90.909  91.228  90.625 
7  86  45  41  81  42  39  94.186  93.333  95.122 
8  52  26  26  49  23  26  94.231  88.462  100.000 
9  57  29  28  55  27  28  96.491  93.103  100.000 
10  47  25  22  41  21  20  87.234  84.000  90.909 
11  73  38  35  63  36  27  86.301  94.737  77.143 
12  78  44  34  66  42  24  84.615  95.455  70.588 
Total  750  375  375  668  338  330  89.067  90.133  88.000 
Mean  62.500  31.250  31.250  55.667  28.167  27.500       
S.D.  25.250  13.765  12.374  24.050  13.279  12.139       
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Figure 2: A Diagrammatic Representation of the Distribution of IPOs on the 
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Table 3: Market-adjusted Returns on IPOs (the Corresponding Shanghai or 
Shenzhen A-share Index as Benchmark)     
 
  Full Sample 
n=668 
IPOs in Shanghai 
n=338 
IPOs in Shenzhen 
n=330 
1
st Trading Day 
1 MAAR  (%)  129.16  127.70  130.66 
WR1  2.28  2.27  2.30 
Standard Deviation  81.24  75.08  87.18 
t-statistic  41.09  31.27  27.22 
Median  118.66  117.86  176.60 
5
th Trading Day 
5 MAAR  (%)  126.93  124.38  129.54 
WR 5  2.26  2.24  2.28 
Standard Deviation  80.06  73.70  86.13 
t-statistic  40.98  31.03  27.32 
Median  114.8  113.91  152.71 
10
th Trading Day 
10 MAAR  (%)  126.93  125.90  128.00 
WR10  2.25  2.24  2.26 
Standard Deviation  82.94  76.98  88.73 
t-statistic  39.56  30.07  26.21 
Median  113.58  113.42  161.44 
20
th Trading Day 
20 MAAR  (%)  124.95  124.33  125.59 
WR 20  2.22  2.22  2.21 
Standard Deviation  83.88  77.86  89.75 
t-statistic  38.50  29.36  25.42 
Median  110.86  112.44  155.91 
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All 129.16 126.93 126.93 124.95
Shanghai 127.7 124.38 125.9 124.33
Shenzhen 130.66 129.54 128 125.59
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Table 4: Testing for Differences in the Market-adjusted Returns of the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
 
  Listing in Shanghai (n=338)  Listing in Shenzhen (n=330) 
1
st Trading Day 
1 MAAR  (%)  127.70  130.66 
t-statistic*  -0.469 
5
th Trading Day 
5 MAAR  (%)  124.38  129.54 
t-statistic  -0.831 
10
th Trading Day 
10 MAAR  (%)  125.90  128.00 
t-statistic  -0.327 
20
th Trading Day 
20 MAAR  (%)  124.33  125.59 
t-statistic  -0.194 
 
Notes: * Difference-of-means t-statistics. ISMA Centre Discussion papers in Finance 2001-12 
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Table 5: Description of the Variables Used in the Study of Underpricing 
 
Year Dummies:  These are based on the 5 different years of the IPOs. (1996-2000) 
Quarter Dummies:  These are based on the 4 different seasons of the IPOs. 
   
Proxies for Demand 
Lotrate  The odds of winning the lottery; the percentage to show the chance to 
win the lottery during IPOs. 
   
Proxies for Risk to Test the Information Asymmetry Hypothesis 
Govshare  Percentage of shares owned by the government and government-
owned companies  
Offersize  The market capitalisation of the listed company on the first day of 
trading, i.e. the offering shares multiply the offering prices  
High-tech dummy  The dummy to show whether a company has some high-tech 
products; 1-yes, 0-no 
   
Proxies for Government Behaviour to Test the Signalling Hypothesis 
EPS  The earning per share of the issuer in the year of issuing 
SEOtimes  The number of SEOs the issuer has within the two years after IPOs 
(tested only for IPOs from 1996-1998) 
Govshare  Percentage of shares owned by the government and government-
owned companies  
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Table 6: Characteristics of Sample Variables 
 
Variable  Mean  Median  Min  Max 
Market-adjusted Initial Returns  1.2916  1.1889  -0.1433  7.4711 
Lotrate   0.0197  0.0060  0.0001  0.9540 
Govshare  0.7070  0.7143  0.4161  0.8492 
Offersize (Million Yuan)  372.1792  261.7500  12.2100  7845.860 
EPS (Yuan)  0.3809  0.3590  0.1075  1.2098 
         
  0  Once  Twice or More 
SEOtimes (For IPOs in 96-98)  156  279  0 
         
  Yes  No 
High-tech Dummy  114  554 
 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Year Dummy  155  185  95  98  135 
 
  Quarter 1  Quarter 2  Quarter 3  Quarter 4 
Quarter Dummy  90  223  185  170 
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Table 7: Correlation Coefficients of the Variables in the Cross Sectional Analysis 
of Underpricing 
 
For all samples 
  Returns  Lotrate  Govshare  Offersize 
Lotrate  -0.194       
Govshare  -0.058  0.040     
Offersize  -0.206  -0.021  -0.026   
EPS  -0.176  0.125  0.112  0.038 
 
For IPOs from 1996 to 1998 
  Returns  Lotrate  Govshare  Offersize  EPS 
Lotrate  -0.233         
Govshare  -0.024  -0.012       
Offersize  -0.214  -0.010  -0.131     
EPS  -0.183  0.089  -0.006  0.218   
SEOtimes  0.005  0.038  -0.175  -0.087  0.060 
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Table 8: Estimating Underpricing of IPOs from 1996 to 2000 
 
Dependent Variable: Market-adjusted Initial Returns 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1 668 
Included observations: 668 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Prob.  Hypothesis 
(expected sign) 
Intercept  4.114  10.586  0.000   
Lotrate  -1.042  -4.117  0.000  1 (-) 
Govshare  -0.725  -2.257  0.024  2, 7 (-) 
LOG(Offersize)  -0.445  -8.729  0.000  3 (-) 
Hightech  0.290  3.670  0.000  4 (+) 
EPS  -0.158  -0.718  0.473  5 (+) 
SEOtimes        6 (+) 
YEAR1996  -0.536  -5.181  0.000   
YEAR1997  0.210  2.396  0.017   
YEAR1999  0.020  0.164  0.870   
YEAR2000  0.396  3.937  0.000   
Quarter1  -0.051  -0.737  0.461   
Quarter2  0.228  3.450  0.001   
Quarter4  0.371  5.403  0.000   
Adjusted R-squared  0.302     
S.E. of regression  0.679     
F-statistic  25.080     
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000     
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Table 9: Estimating Underpricing of IPOs from 1996 to 1998 with the Number of 
SEOs  
 
Dependent Variable: Market-adjusted Initial Returns 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1 435 
Included observations: 435 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Prob.  Hypothesis 
(expected sign) 
Intercept  3.845  9.070  0.000   
Lotrate  -1.120  -4.408  0.000  1 (-) 
Govshare  -0.776  -2.124  0.034  2, 7 (-) 
LOG(Offersize)  -0.381  -7.851  0.000  3 (-) 
Hightech  0.164  1.771  0.077  4 (+) 
EPS  -0.275  -1.129  0.260  5 (+) 
SEOtimes  -0.056  -0.847  0.397  6 (+) 
YEAR1996  -0.468  -4.293  0.000   
YEAR1997  0.215  2.355  0.019   
YEAR1999         
YEAR2000         
Quarter1  0.043  0.514  0.608   
Quarter2  0.326  4.064  0.000   
Quarter4  0.413  4.951  0.000   
Adjusted R-squared  0.313     
S.E. of regression  0.636     
F-statistic  19.006     
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000     
 
 